Violence, bribery, and fraud: the political economy of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa

Paul Collier () and Pedro Vicente

Public Choice, 2012, vol. 153, issue 1, 117-147

Abstract: Post-Soviet African democratization has introduced elections into contexts that often lack restraints upon the behavior of candidates, resulting in the emergence of voter intimidation, vote-buying, and ballot fraud. We propose a model of electoral competition where, although some voters oppose violence, it is effective in intimidating swing voters. We show that in equilibrium a weak challenger will use violence, which corresponds to a terrorism strategy. Similarly, a nationally weak incumbent will use repression. However, a stronger incumbent facing local competition will prefer to use bribery or ballot fraud. We discuss the applicability of the model to several African elections. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Keywords: Violence; Fraud; Vote-buying; Electoral politics; Political economy; Sub-Saharan Africa; D72; O55; P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (75)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9777-z

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