The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests

Paul Schweinzer and Ella Segev ()

Public Choice, 2012, vol. 153, issue 1, 69-82

Abstract: We show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entire prize pool to the winner, provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists. If such an equilibrium fails to exist under the winner-take-all structure, we construct the optimal prize structure which improves existence conditions by dampening efforts. If no such optimal equilibrium exists, no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium induces positive efforts. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Keywords: Tournaments; Incentive structures; Rent seeking; C7; D72; J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (59)

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Working Paper: The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests (2008)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9774-2

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