On choosing the alternative with the best median evaluation

Jean-François Laslier

Public Choice, 2012, vol. 153, issue 3, 269-277

Abstract: The voting rule proposed by Basset and Persky (Public Choice 99:299–310, 1999 ) picks the alternative with the best median evaluation. This paper shows that this MaxMed principle is equivalent to the MaxMin (so-called Rawls’) principle, with the proviso that one can discard half of the population. In one-dimensional, single-peaked domains, the paper compares the MaxMed rule with majority rule and the utilitarian criterion. The MaxMed outcome is rejected by a majority of voters in favor of outcomes that are also utilitarian improvements. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Keywords: Voting; Median; Condorcet; Utilitarianism; Rawls (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9792-0

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