The institutional dimension of election design

Paul Edelman ()

Public Choice, 2012, vol. 153, issue 3, 287-293

Abstract: The traditional approach to election design focuses solely on the best method to aggregate the preferences of the voters. But elections are run by institutions, and the interests of the institution may not be reflected in the preferences of the voter. In this comment I discuss how institutional considerations come into play in election design in three areas: political representation, corporate voting, and judging in competitions. As an illustration of this institutional approach I appraise the method by which the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences selects the nominees and winners of the Oscars. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Keywords: Social choice; Elections; Arrow; Oscars (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9794-y

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