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The timing of elections in federations: a disciplining device against soft budget constraints?

Karolina Kaiser () and Emmanuelle Taugourdeau

Public Choice, 2013, vol. 154, issue 3, 197-215

Abstract: We introduce political economics into the soft budget constraint problem by asking if the timing of elections has the potential to harden budget constraints. Specifically, we ask under which circumstances the soft budget constraint problem is worse—with synchronized elections, i.e. simultaneous central and regional office terms, or with staggered elections, i.e. terms of office that do not coincide. We find that staggered elections clearly improve fiscal discipline at the local level as well as welfare. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Keywords: Soft budget constraints; Fiscal federalism; Elections; D72; H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Timing of Elections in Federations: A Disciplining Device against Soft Budget Constraints ? (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: The Timing of Elections in Federations: A Disciplining Device against Soft Budget Constraints ? (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: The Timing of Elections in Federations: A Disciplining Device against Soft Budget Constraints? (2010) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9814-y

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