Inequality in developing economies: the role of institutional development

Adalgiso Amendola, Joshy Easaw and Antonio Savoia

Public Choice, 2013, vol. 155, issue 1, 43-60

Abstract: This paper studies the distributive impact of institutional change in developing countries. In such economies, property rights systems may preserve the interests of an influential minority, who can control key-markets, access to assets and investment opportunities, especially if they enjoy disproportionate political power. We test this hypothesis using cross-section and panel data methods on a sample of low- and middle-income economies from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Results suggest that: (a) increasing property rights protection increases income inequality; (b) this effect is larger in low-democracy environments; (c) some countries have developed political institutions capable of counterbalancing this effect. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Keywords: Inequality; Developing economies; Institutions; Property rights; Democracy; O15; O17; D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Inequality in Developing Economies: The Role of Institutional Development (2011)
Working Paper: Inequality in Developing Economies: The Role of Institutional Development (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:155:y:2013:i:1:p:43-60

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9838-3

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