Economic voting in Portuguese municipal elections
Rodrigo Martins and
Francisco Veiga
Public Choice, 2013, vol. 155, issue 3, 317-334
Abstract:
This paper analyses the impact of economic conditions on Portuguese municipal electoral outcomes. We use two extensive datasets to estimate an economic voting model which accounts for the possibility that different levels of government have different levels of responsibility for economic outcomes and for clarity of government responsibility. The empirical results indicate that the performance of the national economy is important especially if local governments are of the same party as the central government. The municipal situation is also relevant particularly in scenarios of greater clarity of national and sub-national government responsibility. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
Keywords: Local governments; Elections; Portugal; Voting; Economic conditions; D72; H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Economic Voting in Portuguese Municipal Elections (2011) 
Working Paper: Economic Voting in Portuguese Municipal Elections (2010) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:155:y:2013:i:3:p:317-334
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9849-0
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