Intergovernmental fiscal transfers as pork barrel

Linda Veiga and Francisco Veiga

Public Choice, 2013, vol. 155, issue 3, 335-353

Abstract: This paper uses a simultaneous equations model to analyze increases in intergovernmental fiscal transfers and associated vote changes in Portuguese legislative elections. The results suggest that election year increases in transfers by the central government to municipalities secure added votes, and that these transfers are targeted at jurisdictions where the government faces the risk of losing support. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Keywords: Intergovernmental transfers; Electoral competition; Pork-barrel politics; H77; D72; D78; E62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

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Working Paper: Intergovernmental fiscal transfers as pork barrel (2010)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9863-2

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