The economic value of military connections in Turkey

Gökçe Göktepe and Shanker Satyanath ()

Public Choice, 2013, vol. 155, issue 3, 552 pages

Abstract: Can financial connections to the military provide economic value in democratic environments? We address this question by studying whether firms in which the Turkish military had a controlling financial interest earned abnormally high stock returns on the Istanbul stock exchange. Our findings from event studies are that this is indeed the case. We infer that militaries can retain substantial power to influence economic policy from behind the scenes even after formally transferring it to democratically elected leaders. The paper contributes to the literature in public choice by demonstrating econometrically that the military can be a major rent seeking actor even in democratic environments. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Keywords: Democratic transitions; Democracy; Political development; Political economy; N45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9886-8

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