Two-round elections, one-round determinants? Evidence from the French municipal elections

Aurélie Cassette, Etienne Farvaque and Jérôme Héricourt

Public Choice, 2013, vol. 156, issue 3, 563-591

Abstract: Using a new database of French municipalities that covers 821 towns and two elections (2001 and 2008), we examine how the budget structure, degree of electoral competition and the economic context affect the share of votes for the incumbent. We take into account the institutional details of the two-round structure of the electoral process created by French electoral rules (dual ballot under plurality rules). We show that in the first round of the electoral process, spending on equipment (including infrastructures) can influence the voter, and that electoral competition has a strong impact on the incumbent’s score. In the second round, the incumbent’s vote is affected more by national considerations and local budget variables have no effect. We show that the dynamics between the first and the second rounds are intense. The results suggest that the determinants of each round’s outcome in a two-round electoral process are different. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Keywords: Economic voting; Local elections; Plurality rule; Visible expenditures; D72; H72; H76 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Working Paper: Two-round elections, one-round determinants? Evidence from the French municipal elections (2011)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-9913-4

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