Does a membership fee foster successful public good provision? An experimental investigation of the provision of a step-level collective good
Mohamed Bchir () and
Marc Willinger ()
Public Choice, 2013, vol. 157, issue 1, 25-39
We report the results of an experiment investigating the provision of a step-level collective good. This experiment compares the behavior of subjects in a public good game with the behavior of subjects in a club good game. In the club good game, players who do not contribute the membership fee are excluded from the consumption of the collective good. The introduction of a small membership fee has surprisingly strong effects: it increases the provision of the collective good, delays provision failures and increases the number of contributors. The experiment also reveals the limits of the introduction of a small fee. At a high threshold level, the membership fee no longer ensures successful provision. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
Keywords: C92; D71; D60; H41; Public goods; Club goods; Membership fee; Step-level; Coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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