Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence

Jakob de Haan and Jeroen Klomp

Public Choice, 2013, vol. 157, issue 3, 387-410

Abstract: Until recently, most research on political budget cycles was based on the (often implicit) presumption that these cycles do not differ across countries. However, more recent studies focus on heterogeneity. This paper surveys studies examining the factors conditioning the occurrence and strength of manipulation of fiscal policy for electoral purposes, at the aggregate level or at the level of a particular type of government expenditure. Conditioning factors discussed include: the level of development, institutional quality, age and level of democracy, electoral rules and form of government, transparency of the political process, the presence of checks and balances, and fiscal rules. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Keywords: Political budget cycles; Conditionality; Survey; E62; H62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (140)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:157:y:2013:i:3:p:387-410

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0106-6

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