Democratization and the size of government: evidence from the long 19th century

Toke Aidt and Peter Jensen

Public Choice, 2013, vol. 157, issue 3, 542 pages

Abstract: We study the consequences of franchise extension and ballot reform for the size of government in Western Europe between 1820 and 1913. We find that franchise extension exhibits a U-shaped association with revenue per capita and a positive association with spending per capita. Instrumental variables estimates, however, suggest that the U-shaped relationship may be non-causal and our fixed effects estimates point to substantial cross-country heterogeneity. Further, we find that the secret ballot did not matter for tax revenues per capita but might have expanded the size of government relative to GDP. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Keywords: Suffrage; Threat of revolution; Taxation; Size of government; D7; P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)

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Working Paper: Democratization and the Size of Government: Evidence from the Long 19th Century (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:157:y:2013:i:3:p:511-542

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0073-y

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