The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council

Axel Dreher, Matthew Gould, Matthew Rablen and James Vreeland

Public Choice, 2014, vol. 158, issue 1, 83 pages

Abstract: The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks—election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. We also find evidence that richer countries from the developing world win election more often, while involvement in warfare lowers election probability. By contrast, development aid does not predict election. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: United Nations; Security Council; Turn-taking norm; Elections; F53; F55; O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Working Paper: The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council (2012)
Working Paper: The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council (2012)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0096-4

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