An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule

Keith Dougherty (), Brian Pitts, Justin Moeller and Robi Ragan

Public Choice, 2014, vol. 158, issue 3, 359-382

Abstract: Scholars traditionally claim that unanimity rule is more capable of producing Pareto optimal outcomes than majority rule. Dougherty and Edward (Public Choice 151(3):655–678, 2012 ) make the opposite claim assuming proposals are either random, sincere, or strategic. We test these competing hypotheses in a two-dimensional framework using laboratory experiments. Our primary results suggest: (1) majority rule enters the Pareto set more quickly than unanimity rule, (2) majority rule leaves the Pareto set at the same rate as unanimity rule, and (3) majority rule is more likely to select a Pareto optimal outcome than unanimity rule at the end of the game. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2014

Keywords: Majority rule; Unanimity rule; Pareto optimality; Empirical social choice; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9901-0

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