Can democracy induce development? A constitutional perspective

Hans Gersbach and Lars-Hinrich Siemers ()

Public Choice, 2014, vol. 159, issue 1, 177-196

Abstract: We examine the constitutional design required for democratic societies to overcome poverty traps. Restricting agenda setting by ensuring subsistence levels of consumption and applying simple majority voting as a decision rule will not enable a society to overcome poverty. We show that a combination of suitable constitutional rules can, however, overcome poverty and induce economic well-being. Besides majority voting, these rules include rotating agenda setting, agenda repetition, and tax-protection rules. We thus highlight the crucial role of democratic institutions for economic development. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Constitutional design; Institutions; Poverty traps; Redistribution; Tax allowances; Voting rules; D72; E62; H23; H53; O11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:159:y:2014:i:1:p:177-196

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-0036-8

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