A correction to Potters and van Winden (1992)

Jason Weinreb () and Joan Ricart-Huguet

Public Choice, 2014, vol. 159, issue 1, 23-26

Abstract: This note amends the model of informational lobbying presented in Potters and van Winden (Public Choice 74:269–292, 1992 ). In the original article, the authors find that only separating and pooling equilibria exist when the cost of lobbying is intermediate and the policymaker’s prior favors the interest group’s preferred policy. However, we prove that a semi-separating equilibrium also exists under these conditions. Implications for lobbying behavior are discussed. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2014

Keywords: Lobbying; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-0010-5

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