Popularity, polarization, and political budget cycles

Marek Hanusch () and Daniel Magleby ()

Public Choice, 2014, vol. 159, issue 3, 457-467

Abstract: A vast literature has established that governments may abuse policy instruments in order to enhance their popularity and thus their probability of reelection, resulting in political budget cycles. Yet do popular governments have the same incentives to boost their popularity through pre-electoral expansions as unpopular governments? The existing empirical evidence, which to this date is entirely country-specific, produces mixed messages. Some studies find a simple linear relationship between popularity and the magnitude of political budget cycles and some find a non-linear relationship, peaking at the point where the race for office is tight. This article presents a simple theoretical model, which suggests that party polarization may be the key mediator reconciling these alternative findings. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Political budget cycles; Polarization; Government popularity; Fiscal policy; Elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-0055-5

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