Identifying the bandwagon effect in two-round elections
Áron Kiss and
Gábor Simonovits
Public Choice, 2014, vol. 160, issue 3, 327-344
Abstract:
We propose a new method to test for the existence of the bandwagon effect, the notion that voters are more likely to vote for a given candidate if they expect the candidate to win. Two-round election systems with a large number of single-member districts offer an ideal testing ground because results from the first round provide a better benchmark for voter expectations than any possible alternative measure. Using data from the 2002 and 2006 general elections in Hungary, we find that the lead of a candidate in the first round is magnified by about 10 percent in the second round, controlling for country-wide swings of the electorate between the two rounds and for the behavior of voters of smaller parties. A separate exercise suggests that at least part of the effect is caused by the lower probability of individuals voting in the second round if their preferred candidate is likely to lose by a large margin. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014
Keywords: Bandwagon effect; Underdog effect; Two-round elections; Runoff; Turnout; West Coast effect; D72; D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-013-0146-y (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:160:y:2014:i:3:p:327-344
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0146-y
Access Statistics for this article
Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II
More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().