The effect of the election of prosecutors on criminal trials

Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay and Bryan McCannon

Public Choice, 2014, vol. 161, issue 1, 156 pages

Abstract: We examine whether elections of public prosecutors influence the mix of cases taken to trial versus plea bargained. A theoretical model is constructed wherein voters use outcomes of the criminal justice system as a signal of prosecutors’ quality, leading to a distortion in the mix of cases taken to trial. Using data from North Carolina we test whether reelection pressures lead to (a) an increase in the number and proportion of convictions from jury trials and (b) a decrease in the average sanction obtained in both jury trials and pleas. Our empirical findings are consistent with our theoretical predictions. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Crime; Election; Plea bargaining; Prosecutor; Trials (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Working Paper: The Effect of the Election of Prosecutors on Criminal Trials (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:161:y:2014:i:1:p:141-156

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0144-0

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