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Campaigns, political mobility, and communication

Hans Gersbach

Public Choice, 2014, vol. 161, issue 1, 49 pages

Abstract: We study the interdependence between campaign contributions, the candidates’ positions, and electoral outcomes. In our model, a candidate who moves away from his firmly established position towards a more risky one generates costs for the voters. Campaign contributions allow the candidates to reduce these mobility costs. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the position choices of candidates would exist. With unrestricted financing of political campaigns, two equilibria emerge, depending on whether a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or rightist candidate. Interest groups may finance candidates whose position is far away from their own ideal point. The equilibria generate a variety of new features of campaign games, and may help identify the objective functions of candidates empirically. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Elections; Campaign contributions; Interest groups; Run of donors; C72; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication (2009) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0125-3

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