Assessing strategic voting in the 2008 US presidential primaries: the role of electoral context, institutional rules, and negative votes

D. Hillygus () and Sarah Treul ()

Public Choice, 2014, vol. 161, issue 3, 517-536

Abstract: We examine the nature and extent of strategic voting in the 2008 US presidential primary. In doing so, we distinguish positive strategic voters—those casting ballots for their second choice in the primary and general election—from negative strategic voters—those casting ballots for a candidate they want to lose in the general election. We find evidence of both types in 2008. Moreover, we show that the likelihood of voting strategically is related to the electoral and institutional context. Specifically, those who prefer trailing candidates and who live in states with open primaries or with elections after John McCain became the presumed nominee were more likely to vote strategically. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Negative strategic voting; Open primaries; Electoral institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-014-0183-1

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