Ruling elites’ rotation and asset ownership: implications for property rights

Leonid Polishchuk and Georgiy Syunyaev ()

Public Choice, 2015, vol. 162, issue 1, 159-182

Abstract: We provide a theory and empirical evidence indicating that the rotation of ruling elites in conjunction with elites’ asset ownership could improve property rights protection in non-democracies. The mechanism that upholds property rights is based on elites’ concern about the security of their own asset ownership in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible commitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Endogenous property rights; Credible commitment; “Stationary bandit”; K11; O17; P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Working Paper: uling Elites' Rotation and Asset Ownership: Implications for Property Rights (2014)
Working Paper: Ruling elites' rotation and asset ownership: Implications for property rights (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:162:y:2015:i:1:p:159-182

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-014-0210-2

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