Keeping the party together

Hande Mutlu-Eren ()

Public Choice, 2015, vol. 164, issue 1, 117-133

Abstract: Under what conditions do political parties split? This paper presents a model of intra-party politics to explain party unity in parliamentary systems. The theory derived from an incomplete information game predicts that parties split with positive probability, which rises with the cost of dissent following a failed attempt to split and falls with the cost of forming a new party. Party unity also is predicted to be high when the leadership faction’s weight within the party is large. The model’s results have implications for the relationship between party unity and the majority status of the government party, party system polarization as well as intra-party polarization. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Party split; Intra-party dynamics; Party factions; Party formation; Perfect Bayesian equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-015-0277-4 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:164:y:2015:i:1:p:117-133

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-015-0277-4

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().