Negative campaigning in a probabilistic voting model

Jan Brueckner and Kangoh Lee ()

Public Choice, 2015, vol. 164, issue 3, 379-399

Abstract: This paper extends the small existing theoretical literature on negative campaigning, building on work by Harrington and Hess (Games Econ Behav 17:209–229, 1996 ). While their analysis explores the determinants of negative campaign spending using a classic spatial voting model, this paper relies instead on a probabilistic voting model, extending the use of this popular model to a new setting. The main lesson of the analysis is that negative campaign spending is higher for the relatively more-centrist candidate. The more-extreme candidate in the electoral contest devotes, by contrast, comparatively more of her funds to positive campaign spending. This result, which at first appears unrelated to the main findings of Harrington and Hess (Games Econ Behav 17:209–229, 1996 ) and Chakrabarti (Scottish J Polit Econ 54:136–149, 2007 ), actually can be viewed as aligning with their conclusions, although the underlying mechanics are very different. The paper also offers an empirical test of this prediction. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Negative campaigning; Candidate valence; Ideology; Extreme; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Negative Campaigning in a Probabilistic Voting Model (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:164:y:2015:i:3:p:379-399

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-015-0283-6

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