The political economy of the Essential Air Service program

Joshua Hall, Amanda Ross () and Christopher Yencha

Public Choice, 2015, vol. 165, issue 1, 147-164

Abstract: We find that congressional influences affect the amount of airport subsidies that a congressional district receives through the Essential Air Service (EAS) program. The EAS program was passed with the goal of helping to continue commercial air service to rural communities following deregulation in the 1970s. Using data from 1998–2014, we find strong and consistent evidence that subsidies are higher in districts having congressional representation on the House Transportation and Ways and Means Committees. Our empirical results, when combined with news reports of members claiming credit for securing EAS funding, are consistent with the EAS serving private and public interests. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Congressional dominance; Deregulation; Airports; D73; L93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: The Political Economy of the Essential Air Service Program (2015)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-015-0298-z

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