Capture and the bureaucratic mafia: does the revolving door erode bureaucratic integrity?

Sounman Hong () and Jeehun Lim ()
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Sounman Hong: Yonsei University
Jeehun Lim: Yonsei University

Public Choice, 2016, vol. 166, issue 1, No 5, 69-86

Abstract: Abstract Does the revolving door phenomenon erode bureaucratic integrity? To answer this question, we undertake a quantitative case study of a private university in South Korea that recruited a former vice minister of education as its president. Specifically, we investigate whether after employing this high-ranking former public official the university received favorable treatment from the education ministry in terms of funding. Estimates from difference-in-difference, triple difference, and synthetic control methods all suggest that the high-profile public official’s recruitment is associated with financial benefits from the official’s former employing agency; no such advantage, however, was observed for benefits from other agencies. This result offers suggestive but compelling evidence that the revolving door distorts the allocation of government resources; the financial benefits the university received are due not to the recruited official’s greater competence, expertise, or knowledge but rather to his implicit collusion with the government.

Keywords: Capture; Revolving door; Corruption; Lobbying; Allocative efficiency; Political connections; Bureaucratic integrity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D70 D71 D72 D73 H52 I22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0315-x

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