Intra-party diversity and ministerial selection in coalition governments

Hanna Bäck (), Marc Debus () and Wolfgang C. Müller ()
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Hanna Bäck: Lund University
Marc Debus: Mannheim University
Wolfgang C. Müller: University of Vienna

Public Choice, 2016, vol. 166, issue 3, No 5, 355-378

Abstract: Abstract This study focuses on the allocation of politicians to cabinet offices in different institutional settings. We argue that cabinet ministers are appointed with the aim of minimizing the policy distance to the most important principal, which could be the Prime Minister, the coalition, or the individual parties that form the coalition. We advance this field of research by performing a comparative analysis of different coalition systems. We evaluate our hypotheses by estimating the policy positions of Austrian, German and Swedish politicians on the basis of a computerized content analysis of their speeches given in parliament. The results provide support for our argument and show that the policy distance towards the dominant principal is important for becoming a cabinet member.

Keywords: Cabinet ministers; Coalition governments; Principal–agent theory; Prime Ministers; Computerized content analysis; Parliamentary speeches (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0327-6

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