Bargaining complexity and the duration of government formation: evidence from Flemish municipalities

Tom Blockmans (), Benny Geys, Bruno Heyndels and Bram Mahieu
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Tom Blockmans: Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Bruno Heyndels: Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Bram Mahieu: Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Public Choice, 2016, vol. 167, issue 1, No 7, 143 pages

Abstract: Abstract Government formation processes have attracted a substantial amount of scholarly attention. Yet, only few scholars try to explain the duration of government formations. This article extends the latter literature by examining the relation between the complexity of the bargaining environment and the duration of government formations at the local government level. We show that increased bargaining complexity—reflected in parties’ ideological similarity, a larger number of potential bargaining partners, and an election result allowing for a larger set of mathematically feasible governments—is associated with longer bargaining delays.

Keywords: Coalition formation; Ideology; Political party; Policy preferences; Local government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0333-8

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