Supermajority rule and bicameral bargaining

Dongwon Lee ()
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Dongwon Lee: Sungkyunkwan University

Public Choice, 2016, vol. 169, issue 1, No 3, 53-75

Abstract: Abstract This paper revisits the claim that supermajority rules and bicameral legislative structures restrain excessive government spending and taxation. Our analysis suggests that the extension effect of a supermajority rule—that requires logrolling across additional members—increases with the ratio of seats in the House relative to seats in the Senate. Using a panel of US states, 1970–2008, we find that the ratio of House-to-Senate seats has a robust, positive impact on the tendency of a supermajority rule to inflate the budget. Our finding implies that a supermajority rule can have a perverse effect on budget outcomes in bicameral legislatures owing to two factors: the geographic overlap between chambers and the low price elasticity of demand for public goods.

Keywords: Supermajority rule; Bicameral legislatures; Legislative bargaining; Budget institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0369-9

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