Voters’ responsiveness to public employment policies
Marta Curto-Grau ()
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Marta Curto-Grau: Heidelberg University and Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB)
Public Choice, 2017, vol. 170, issue 1, No 7, 143-169
Abstract:
Abstract This paper examines the electoral rewards for the distribution of public employment. We focus on the Spanish Plan for Rural Employment, a public jobs program introduced by the central government in two lagging regions. We evaluate voters’ responsiveness to this policy using municipal-level electoral data and employ an estimator that combines difference-in-differences with propensity score matching. The main findings are that the program lead to an increase in the vote share for the ruling party in the treated municipalities. This effect is very persistent over the years, and it is unlikely to be explained by turnout buying.
Keywords: Redistribution; Public employment; Electoral rewards; Difference-in-differences matching estimator (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H53 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:170:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0388-6
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0388-6
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