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Minor candidates as kingmakers

Akifumi Ishihara and Shintaro Miura ()
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Shintaro Miura: Kanagawa University

Public Choice, 2017, vol. 170, issue 3, 253-263

Abstract: Abstract We consider a sequential entry model with three candidates who cannot commit to any policy announcement during the campaign. The study focuses on how a minor candidate, who wins only when unopposed, influences the electoral outcome. We show that unless the Condorcet winner (i.e., the winner in every pairwise vote) coincides with the grand winner (i.e., the winner of the three-candidate competition), the minor candidate is a kingmaker in the sense that his preferred rival wins regardless of the order of the entry decisions. To influence the outcome, the minor candidate could either (i) enter strategically without any chance to win, or (ii) enter if and only if the Condorcet winner already has entered.

Keywords: Minor candidates; Kingmakers; Sequential entry decisions; Condorcet winner; Strategic candidacy; Threatening; D72; D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:170:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0393-9