Equality, legitimacy, interests, and preferences: historical notes on Quadratic Voting in a political context

Josiah Ober ()
Additional contact information
Josiah Ober: Stanford University

Public Choice, 2017, vol. 172, issue 1, No 10, 223-232

Abstract: Abstract The history of political theory can shed light on the question of what political contexts are and are not appropriate for Quadratic Voting (QV), and the methods by which extra votes might be distributed when QV is appropriate. Ancient Greek and contemporary political thought draws attention to the connections between the assumed equality of moral worth among citizens and systems of voting, and to the relationship between equality or inequality of standing to the bases of dessert and the fair distribution of political influence in a democratic state. These matters in turn bear directly on democratic legitimacy, and thus on the stability of the social order. Some issues that must be decided in a democratic community concern common interests. Common-interest issues, based on widely held conceptions of equal moral worth, are not appropriately determined by preference intensity, and thus are inappropriate for a QV voting system. Real-money versions of QV risk undermining respect for law and democratic legitimacy. The costs of system-threatening civil conflict attendant upon loss of legitimacy outweighs any efficiency gains within the system. Token-currency versions of QV, which do not threaten democratic legitimacy, are a more plausible option for the application of QV to political issues in which correlating unequal influence with preference intensity does not conflict with assumptions of equal moral worth.

Keywords: Aristotle; Equality; Legitimacy; Quadratic Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-017-0409-0 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:172:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0409-0

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-017-0409-0

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().