Efficient collective decision-making, marginal cost pricing, and quadratic voting

Nicolaus Tideman () and Florenz Plassmann
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Nicolaus Tideman: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Florenz Plassmann: State University of New York at Binghamton

Public Choice, 2017, vol. 172, issue 1, No 3, 45-73

Abstract: Abstract We discuss the mechanisms related to quadratic voting, from Vickrey’s counter-speculation mechanism and his second-price auction, through the family of Groves mechanisms and its most notable member, the Clarke mechanism, to the expected externality mechanism, Goeree and Zhang’s mechanism, the Groves–Ledyard mechanism, and the Hylland–Zeckhauser mechanism. We show that each mechanism that involves collective decisions has a quadratic aspect and that all of the mechanisms that we discuss are applications of the fundamental insight that for a process to be efficient, all parties involved must bear the marginal social costs of their actions.

Keywords: Quadratic voting; Expected externality mechanism; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism; Groves–Ledyard mechanism; Hylland–Zeckhauser mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-017-0411-6

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