Quadratic election law

Eric A. Posner () and Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos
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Eric A. Posner: University of Chicago
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos: University of Chicago

Public Choice, 2017, vol. 172, issue 1, No 12, 265-282

Abstract: Abstract The standard form of electoral system in the United States—plurality voting with one person, one vote—suffers from countless defects, many of which stem from its failure to enable people to register the intensity of their preferences for political outcomes when they vote. Quadratic voting, an elegant alternative system proposed by Glen Weyl, provides a theoretically attractive solution to this problem but is an awkward fit with America’s legal and political traditions. We identify the legal barriers to the adoption of quadratic voting, discuss modified versions that could pass muster, and show how even a modified version would address many of the pathologies of the existing system.

Keywords: Electoral systems; Election law; Collective decision-making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-017-0415-2

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