Revenge: John Sherman, Russell Alger and the origins of the Sherman Act

Patrick Newman ()
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Patrick Newman: Florida Southern College

Public Choice, 2018, vol. 174, issue 3, No 4, 257-275

Abstract: Abstract This paper argues that Senator John Sherman of Ohio was motivated to introduce an antitrust bill in late 1889 partly as a way of enacting revenge on his political rival, General and former Governor Russell Alger of Michigan, because Sherman believed that Alger personally had cost him the presidential nomination at the 1888 Republican national convention. When discussing his bill on the Senate floor and elsewhere, Sherman repeatedly brought up Alger’s relationship, which in reality was rather tenuous, with the well-known Diamond Match Company. The point of mentioning Alger was to hurt Alger’s future political career and his presidential aspirations in 1892. Sherman was able to pursue his revenge motive by combining it with the broader Republican goals of preserving high tariffs and attacking the trusts. As a result, this paper reinforces previous public choice literature arguing that the 1890 Sherman Act was not passed in the public interest, but instead advanced private interests.

Keywords: Antitrust; Election of 1888; John Sherman; Revenge; Sherman Antitrust Act (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N41 N82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-017-0497-x

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