How defense shapes the institutional organization of states
Fabio Padovano and
Yvon Rocaboy ()
Additional contact information
Fabio Padovano: University of Rennes 1
Public Choice, 2018, vol. 175, issue 1, 111-134
Abstract We analyze theoretically how the provision of military services explains the vertical and horizontal fragmentation of a state. The model innovates on the previous political economy literature which views such institutional arrangements arising only as a response to internal ”technological” forces, not to strategic interactions within the state and with neighboring states. The model explains how these interactions lead communities of individuals to choose among three alternative types of institutional arrangements: 1) a union, i.e., a setting wherein both the vertical and the horizontal fragmentation of a state is minimized; 2) an alliance, whereby a state becomes more vertically fragmented by creating an upper government tier devised to take advantage of economies of scale; 3) autonomy, where horizontal fragmentation is maximized, as no merging of communities occurs and no higher government tier is created. A series of simulations of the model define the conditions under which each alternative institutional arrangement emerges in equilibrium.
Keywords: Institutional organization; Military goods; Vertical and horizontal fragmentation; Strategic interactions between countries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C35 D70 H40 H72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-018-0516-6 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Working Paper: How defense shapes the institutional organization of states (2018)
Working Paper: How defense shapes the institutional organization of states (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:175:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0516-6
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II
More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().