The political affiliation effect on state credit risk

Darío Cestau ()
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Darío Cestau: IE Business School

Public Choice, 2018, vol. 175, issue 1, No 7, 135-154

Abstract: Abstract Past research largely has ignored the effects of political parties on states’ default risks. This paper addresses that question by analyzing the response of credit spreads to weekly polling data from 17 gubernatorial elections between 2009 and 2012, during the 6 months prior to Election Day. The findings are that political affiliation has a significant effect on states’ default risks. The estimated effect of electing a Republican governor is a 6% reduction in the credit spread of the state. The effect prevails regardless of the party in control of the state legislature, and it is larger when gubernatorial elections are contested closely. Set in the context of case law, the paper links higher tax levels to greater credit risk. Moreover, an analysis of the candidates’ campaign promises suggests that stronger positions against tax increases are associated with less default risks. The results of the paper are therefore consistent with the empirical evidence suggesting that Republicans prefer lower taxes.

Keywords: Credit risk; Polls; State elections; Political affiliation; Municipal bonds (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G1 H3 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0519-3

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