 Rules versus authoritiesPublic Choice, 2018, vol. 175, issue 3, No 1, 219-228 Abstract: Abstract I present a brief history of modern public choice analysis as told through the lens of “rules versus authorities”, a dichotomy initially formulated by Henry C. Simons, University of Chicago professor to James M. Buchanan. Framing political decision-making as a choice between rules and authorities allows us to identify two necessary, motivating ideas for the emergence of public choice: (1) Governments are not monolithic, omniscient, social calculating machines, but are instead a collection of individuals with various and possibly competing interests. (2) Rather than empowering bureaucracies, economists and political scientists should devise rules that constrain government experts and protect democratic decision-making. Lurking behind both ideas is the legacy of Simons and his antipathy to expert management of the economy. In that antipathy, Simons makes an important contribution to the intellectual history of public choice and to Buchanan’s research program. Keywords: James M. Buchanan; Henry C. Simons; Rules; Authorities; History of public choice (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:175:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0544-2 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0544-2 Access Statistics for this article Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II More articles in Public Choice from Springer |
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