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External validation of voter turnout models by concealed parameter recovery

Antonio Merlo () and Thomas R. Palfrey ()
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Thomas R. Palfrey: California Institute of Technology

Public Choice, 2018, vol. 176, issue 1, No 16, 297-314

Abstract: Abstract We conduct a model validation analysis of several behavioral models of voter turnout, using laboratory data. We call our method of model validation concealed parameter recovery, where estimation of a model is done under a veil of ignorance about some of the experimentally controlled parameters—in this case voting costs. We use quantal response equilibrium as the underlying, common structure for estimation, and estimate models of instrumental voting, altruistic voting, expressive voting, and ethical voting. All the models except the ethical voting model recover the concealed parameters reasonably well. We also report the results of a counterfactual analysis based on the recovered parameters, to compare the policy implications of the different models about the cost of a subsidy to increase turnout.

Keywords: Voter turnout; Model validation; Concealed parameter recovery; Laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 C52 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Related works:
Working Paper: External Validation of Voter Turnout Models by Concealed Parameter Recovery (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: External Validation of Voter Turnout Models by Concealed Parameter Recovery (2013) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0523-7

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