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Who does better for the economy? Presidents versus parliamentary democracies

Richard McManus () and F. Gulcin Ozkan
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Richard McManus: Canterbury Christ Church University
F. Gulcin Ozkan: University of York

Public Choice, 2018, vol. 176, issue 3, 361-387

Abstract: Abstract Are certain forms of government associated with superior economic outcomes? This paper attempts to answer that question by examining how government systems influence macroeconomic performance. We find that presidential regimes consistently are associated with less favorable outcomes than parliamentary regimes: slower output growth, higher and more volatile inflation and greater income inequality. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is sizable. For example, annual output growth is between 0.6 and 1.2 percentage points lower and inflation is estimated to be at least four percentage points higher under presidential regimes relative to those under parliamentary ones. The difference in distributional outcomes is even starker; income inequality is 12 to 24% worse under presidential systems.

Keywords: Constitutional economics; Form of government; Economic growth; Inflation; Income inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E02 H11 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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