EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The elimination paradox: apportionment in the Democratic Party

Michael A. Jones (), David McCune () and Jennifer Wilson ()
Additional contact information
Michael A. Jones: Mathematical Reviews
David McCune: William Jewell College
Jennifer Wilson: Eugene Lang College, The New School

Public Choice, 2019, vol. 178, issue 1, No 4, 53-65

Abstract: Abstract To award delegates in their presidential primary elections, the US Democratic Party uses Hamilton’s method of apportionment after eliminating any candidates (and their votes) that receive less than 15% of the total votes cast. We illustrate how a remaining candidate may have his or her delegate total decline as a result of other candidates being eliminated; this leads to a new elimination paradox. We relate that paradox to the new states, no show, and population paradoxes and show that divisor methods are not susceptible to the elimination paradox. We conclude with instances in which the elimination paradox may occur in other contexts, including parliamentary systems.

Keywords: Elimination paradox; Democratic primary; Population monotonicity; 91B32; 91B12; 91F10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-018-0608-3 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:178:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0608-3

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0608-3

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:178:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0608-3