Problems of commitment in arming and war: how insecurity and destruction matter

Michelle Garfinkel and Constantinos Syropoulos ()

Public Choice, 2019, vol. 178, issue 3, No 3, 349-369

Abstract: Abstract This paper analyzes a guns-versus-butter model in which two agents compete for control over an insecure portion of their combined output. They can resolve this dispute either peacefully through settlement or by military force through open conflict (war). Both types of conflict resolution depend on the agents’ arming choices, but only war is destructive. We find that, insofar as entering into binding contracts on arms is not possible and agents must arm even under settlement to secure a bigger share of the contested output, the absence of long-term commitments need not be essential in understanding the outbreak of destructive war. Instead, the ability to make short-term commitments could induce war. More generally, our analysis highlights how the pattern of war’s destructive effects, the degree of output insecurity and the initial distribution of resources matter for arming decisions and the choice between peace and war. We also explore the implications of transfers for peace.

Keywords: Contested property rights; Settlement mechanisms; Destructive conflict; Negotiation; Armed peace (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D30 D74 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Problems of Commitment in Arming and War: How Insecurity and Destruction Matter (2018)
Working Paper: Problems of Commitment in Arming and War: How Insecurity and Destruction Matter (2018)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0601-x

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