UN involvement and civil war peace agreement implementation

Wakako Maekawa, Barış Arı and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis ()
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Wakako Maekawa: University of Essex
Barış Arı: University of Essex
Theodora-Ismene Gizelis: University of Essex

Public Choice, 2019, vol. 178, issue 3, No 5, 397-416

Abstract: Abstract Many studies argue that third-party guarantees, such as those of the United Nations, increase the chances that belligerents will sign peace agreements, but it is unclear how third-party involvement affects the implementation of such agreements. We unpack the relationship between UN involvement and peace agreement success by focusing on the risk of defections during the peace accord implementation phase. We argue that two types of commitment problems, namely involuntary and voluntary defections, emerge from the characteristics of the peace process itself as well as from new opportunities available to rebel groups. We expect that shifts in relative power and polarized voting lead to lower implementation scores overall, but that the deployment of UN troops has a mitigating effect, thereby increasing the prospects of sustainable peace agreements. Using data from the Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset from 1989 to 2010 and personnel commitments to UN peacekeeping operations, we find evidence that large UN missions are better placed to support the implementation and longevity of the peace process.

Keywords: Conflict resolution; UN peacekeeping; Peace agreement implementation; Civil war (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0602-9

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