Dynamic consistency in constitutions

John Yeabsley

Public Choice, 1974, vol. 17, issue 1, 113 pages

Abstract: The existence of procedures to amend constitutions, which are expected at their writing to last for many years, means that amendments that are accepted may not harmonise with the intent of the rest of the constitution. This dynamic inconsistency can be guarded against by asking the constitution to be approved by the method of amendment. Nations whose approval methods differ widely from the amending procedure may find their constitutions suffer from dynamic inconsistency and may be unstable. Copyright Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 1974

Date: 1974
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF01719004 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:17:y:1974:i:1:p:111-113

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/BF01719004

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().