Adaptation and central banking

Alexander Salter and William Luther

Public Choice, 2019, vol. 180, issue 3, No 3, 243-256

Abstract: Abstract What or who governs central bank decisions? Most considerations focus on motivations. Instead, we consider the extent to which specific behaviors have adaptive value in the context of central banking. From that perspective, poor decisions are not the product of poor motivations. They are, instead, a product of the poor institutions within which central bank decision makers operate.

Keywords: Adaptation; Bailout; Central bank; Motivation; Seigniorage; Selection; Research (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E31 E42 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-00633-9

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