Politicians’ coherence and government debt
Giorgio Bellettini () and
Paolo Roberti ()
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Paolo Roberti: University of Bergamo
Public Choice, 2020, vol. 182, issue 1, No 4, 73-91
Abstract We model a society that values coherence between the long-term commitment of politicians to given levels of public good provision and current policy. In that context, we suggest a novel mechanism by which issuing government debt can affect electoral results. Debt is exploited by an incumbent politician who favors a low level of public good supply, taking advantage of the cost paid by her opponent, who is committed to a higher level of supply. More public debt reduces voters’ preferred level of public good consumption and therefore are less likely to elect the opponent, given her commitment to a losing policy.
Keywords: Voting; Strategic debt; Commitment; Coherence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H63 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Politicians' coherence and government debt (2016)
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