Introduction: a symposium on the predatory state

Mehrdad Vahabi

Public Choice, 2020, vol. 182, issue 3, No 1, 233-242

Abstract: Abstract Economists have adopted two broad perspectives on the state: contractual (i.e., provider of public goods and services) and predatory (coercive and extractive). By a predatory state, we mean a state that promotes the private interests of dominant groups within the state (such as politicians, the army and bureaucrats) or influential private groups with strong lobbying powers. Neo-institutional economists support an extended version of the contractual perspective in which the state is not simply a ‘benevolent dictator’ but may itself be composed of predators. However, it considers predation as only a means to promote protection. By contrast, a predatory vision of the state argues that while protection and predation are two faces of the same coin, a predatory state protects only to promote its predation on the private sector. This symposium explores how a predatory approach to the state can shed light on all types of state, from liberal democratic to authoritarian and failed ones, both in the past and present.

Keywords: Predatory state; Contractual state; Predatory welfare state; Passive and active predatory state; Wealth destroying states (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 H5 I3 L5 N4 O12 Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00715-2

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