Electoral cycles, partisan effects and US naturalization policies

Marcus Drometer () and Romuald Méango

Public Choice, 2020, vol. 183, issue 1, No 4, 43-68

Abstract: Abstract Using a panel of naturalizations in the United States from 1965 to 2012, we empirically analyze the impact of elections on naturalization policy. Our results indicate that naturalization policy is (partly) driven by national elections: there are more naturalizations in presidential election years and during the terms of Democratic incumbents. To disentangle the effect of government policies from changes in the demand for naturalizations, we examine how the acceptance rate of naturalization petitions is affected by elections. The analysis reveals that the acceptance rate is much higher under Democratic incumbents with the strongest increase during the years that are closer to the next presidential election. In contrast, (almost) no variation is found under a Republican incumbent. We then investigate the dynamics of an incumbent’s behavior over the course of his term in detail. Our findings indicate that the effects are more pronounced in politically contested states, in states with many migrants and for immigrants originating from Latin America.

Keywords: Electoral cycles; Partisan politics; Naturalization policy; Immigration policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F22 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Electoral Cycles, Partisan Effects and U.S. Naturalization Policies (2017)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00687-3

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