The prevalence and consequences of ballot truncation in ranked-choice elections

D. Marc Kilgour (), Jean-Charles Grégoire () and Angèle M. Foley ()
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D. Marc Kilgour: Wilfrid Laurier University
Jean-Charles Grégoire: Institut National de la Recherche Scientifique
Angèle M. Foley: Wilfrid Laurier University

Public Choice, 2020, vol. 184, issue 1, No 8, 197-218

Abstract: Abstract In ranked-choice elections, voters vote by indicating their preference orderings over the candidates. A ballot is truncated when the ordering is incomplete (called partial voting). Sometimes truncation is forced—voters are allowed to rank only a limited number of candidates—but sometimes it is voluntary. During the vote tabulating process, a truncated ballot is exhausted when all of the candidates it ranks have been eliminated. Ballot exhaustion and, therefore ballot truncation, is a concern in single-winner elections when the margin of victory in the final stage is less than the number of exhausted ballots. That concern motivates our study. We review evidence from actual single-winner ranked-choice elections and conclude that voluntary ballot truncation is very common. Moreover, it is difficult to explain strategically. To assess the significance of ballot truncation, we simulate ranked-choice elections with four, five and six candidates, using both spatial and random models of voter preferences. Does truncation change the probability that a Condorcet winner wins the election? Does the winner change as the extent of truncation increases? We find that even small amounts of truncation can alter election outcomes.

Keywords: Ranked-choice selection; Single-winner; Ballot truncation; Ballot exhaustion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 K16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00723-2

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